The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled last week that the securities-law requirement to plead a “strong inference” of scienter does not apply to claims under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act even where the challenged statement is a statement of opinion. The decision in Grier v. Finjan Holdings, Inc. (In re Finjan Holdings, Inc. Securities Litigation) (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2023) held that, because § 14(e) claims – which arise in connection with tender offers – can be based on mere negligence instead of knowing or reckless misconduct, a plaintiff needs to plead only a “reasonable inference,” rather than a “strong inference,” of an opinion’s subjective falsity.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Father Sometimes Knows Best: District Court Blasts SEC’s “No Admit, No Deny” Provisions
By Jonathan Richman on
In a scathing opinion, Southern District of New York Judge Ronnie Abrams recently blasted the SEC’s standard demand that defendants settling with the Commission agree never to deny the allegations against them. Judge Abrams’ decision in SEC v. Moraes reluctantly approved a consent decree containing the usual “no admit, no deny” provision in light of the Second Circuit’s recent decision upholding such provisions in SEC v. Romeril, in which Judge Abrams’ father (the famed First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams) represented the defendant in his unsuccessful petition for certiorari. But Judge Abram expressed concern that the SEC’s insistence on such provisions violates the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine” and the First Amendment.